Out of my real body: cognitive neuroscience meets eating disorders by Giuseppe Riva
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 06 May 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00236
Out of my real body: cognitive neuroscience meets eating
disorders
Giuseppe Riva1,2*
1 Applied Technology for Neuro-Psychology Lab, Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Milan, Italy
2 Department of Psychology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
Edited by:
Silvio Ionta, CHUV-UNIL,
Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Jane Aspell, Anglia Ruskin
University, UK
Anouk Keizer, Utrecht University,
Netherlands
*Correspondence:
Giuseppe Riva, Department of
Psychology, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli 1,
20123 Milan, Italy
e-mail: giuseppe.riva@unicatt.it
Clinical psychology is starting to explain eating disorders (ED) as the outcome of the
interaction among cognitive, socio-emotional and interpersonal elements. In particular
two influential models—the revised cognitive-interpersonal maintenance model and the
transdiagnostic cognitive behavioral theory—identified possible key predisposing and
maintaining factors. These models, even if very influential and able to provide clear
suggestions for therapy, still are not able to provide answers to several critical questions:
why do not all the individuals with obsessive compulsive features, anxious avoidance or
with a dysfunctional scheme for self-evaluation develop an ED? What is the role of the
body experience in the etiology of these disorders? In this paper we suggest that the path
to a meaningful answer requires the integration of these models with the recent outcomes
of cognitive neuroscience. First, our bodily representations are not just a way to map an
external space but the main tool we use to generate meaning, organize our experience,
and shape our social identity. In particular, we will argue that our bodily experience evolves
over time by integrating six different representations of the body characterized by specific
pathologies—body schema (phantom limb), spatial body (unilateral hemi-neglect), active
body (alien hand syndrome), personal body (autoscopic phenomena), objectified body
(xenomelia) and body image (body dysmorphia). Second, these representations include
either schematic (allocentric) or perceptual (egocentric) contents that interact within the
working memory of the individual through the alignment between the retrieved contents
from long-term memory and the ongoing egocentric contents from perception. In this
view EDs may be the outcome of an impairment in the ability of updating a negative body
representation stored in autobiographical memory (allocentric) with real-time sensorimotor
and proprioceptive data (egocentric).
Keywords: body image, eating disorders, cognitive neuroscience, image schema, body shame, allocentric lock,
autobiographical memory, episodic memory
INTRODUCTION
Eating Disorders (EDs), as clinicians involved in clinical practice
know well, are one of the most resistant and frustrating forms
of psychopathology: patients rarely seek treatment voluntarily
and their clinical behavior is usually characterized by denial and
resistance.
This is particularly true for patients with Anorexia Nervosa
(AN) who may associate denial with an active subversion of
therapy (Vitousek et al., 1998). Often characterized by ambiva-
lent feelings towards treatment (Williams and Reid, 2010),
these patients may start to manipulate their weight, to dispose
of food when unseen, or to increase their level of physical
activity.
If we look at the definitions of Feeding and EDs presented
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
fifth edition (DSM V) we find that the clinical cores of these
disturbances are a dysfunctional eating behavior, an excessive
concern and distress about body shape or weight and, for AN only,
the persistent lack of recognition of the seriousness of the current
low body weight (APA, 2013).
In particular, various authors suggest that the excessive focus
on the body hides the functional and egosyntonic nature of these
disorders (Vitousek et al., 1998; Rich, 2006; Williams and Reid,
2010): ED patients manage their disturbances as both an identity
and an illness. In other words, unlike other mental disturbances,
EDs are also experienced positively by those who live with them
(Serpell et al., 1999; Vanderlinden, 2008): many unhealthy eating
behaviors are functional within the context of the patient’s belief
system, and their benefits include feeling special, gaining a sense
of control, and feeling protected. But the question remains, why
is this so?
Even though the answer to this question is critical to explaining
treatment resistance in ED, the debate remains open (Treasure
et al., 2010; Kaye et al., 2013). In particular, the etiology of ED is a
controversial topic. A first approach considers ED as the outcome
of dysfunctions in the neuronal processes related to appetite and
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emotionality (Kaye et al., 2009, 2013). A second approach explains
ED as the outcome of the interaction between cognitive, socio-
emotional, and interpersonal elements (Schmidt and Treasure,
2006; Fairburn, 2008; Cooper and Fairburn, 2011; Treasure and
Schmidt, 2013).
In their recent reviews, Kaye et al. (2009, 2013) support the
first hypothesis. According to them, patients with AN and Bulimia
Nervosa (BN) share a dysregulation in the anterior ventral striatal
pathway that may create a vulnerability for dysregulated appet-
itive behaviors. If the high level of self-control in individuals
with AN—produced by an exaggerated dorsal cognitive circuit
functioning—allows them to inhibit appetite, this does not hap-
pen in BN patients, based on their limited ability to control their
impulses.
However, several psychologists (Fairburn et al., 2003, 2009;
Schmidt and Treasure, 2006; Cooper and Fairburn, 2011; Treasure
and Schmidt, 2013) propose a more complex picture. Schmidt
and Treasure, in their revised cognitive-interpersonal mainte-
nance model of AN (Schmidt and Treasure, 2006; Treasure
et al., 2012; Treasure and Schmidt, 2013), identify in obsessive-
compulsive features and anxious avoidance (particularly of close
relationships) the key predisposing factors. These factors, when
associated with relevant precipitating factors—e.g., teasing, social
comparison, stressful events—lead to the start and perpetuation
of the disorder. Fairburn et al., in their transdiagnostic cogni-
tive behavioral theory, suggest that EDs share a dysfunctional
system for evaluating self-worth (Fairburn et al., 2003; Fairburn
and Harrison, 2003). Then, one or more additional maintaining
factors, specific for the different EDs, lead to the start and perpet-
uation of the disorder: core low self-esteem, over-perfectionism,
mood intolerance, and interpersonal difficulties (Fairburn et al.,
2003, 2009; Cooper and Fairburn, 2011).
These models, even if very influential and able to provide clear
suggestions for therapy, still are not able to answer several critical
questions: why do not all the individuals with either obsessive
compulsive features or with a dysfunctional scheme for self-
evaluation develop an ED? What is the role of the body experience
in the etiology of these disorders?
While cognitive science has incorporated a lot of clinical
aspects, clinicians generally are more reluctant to incorporate
a cognitive perspective in their view. Yet cognitive science tells
clinical science that many phenomena that are taken for granted,
such as body perception, body experience, and the sense of self,
eventually need further explanations.
In this paper we suggest that the path to a meaningful
answer requires the integration of these clinical models with the
outcomes of two new branches of cognitive sciences: Embod-
ied Cognition and Social Neuroscience (Cacioppo et al., 2006;
Ziemke, 2007; Bridgeman and Tseng, 2011; Wilson and Foglia,
2011; Davis and Markman, 2012; Koziol et al., 2012; Lakoff,
2012; Brugger et al., 2013). The Embodied Cognition approach
underlines the central role of the body in influencing the mind. In
other words, cognition is dependent upon features of the physical
body of an agent. Moreover, the Social Neuroscience approach
underlines the interactions between the subject’s perception of
his own body in relation to others’ bodies and as influenced by
normative standards.
UNDERSTANDING THE BODY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF
EMBODIED COGNITION
We know that EDs refer to a range of problems characterized
by abnormal eating behaviors and beliefs about body image and
shape. Here we suggest that the starting point for understanding
these causal processes is the link between our body and our mind
as described by Embodied Cognition.
According to Embodied Cognition, the body influences the
mind in three separate but related ways: (Wilson and Foglia, 2011)
• Body as Regulator: the body regulates cognitive activity over
space and time, ensuring that cognition and action are tightly
coordinated.
• Body as Distributor: the body distributes computational
and representational load between neural and non-neural
structures.
• Body as Constraint: the body constrains the nature and con-
tent of the representations processed by that agent’s cognitive
system.
Specifically, the theoretical concept introduced by Embodied
Cognition to explain this influence is one of “image schema”
(Johnson, 2007). In the following pages we will detail and
discuss this.
THE ROLE OF SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN EMBODIED COGNITION
According to Johnson (1987), “An image schema is a recurring
dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor pro-
grams that gives coherence and structure to our experience”
(p. xiv). Image schemas have been suggested as playing a critical
developmental role, forming both the basis of early cognitive
development, and possibly extending to all sensory-motor per-
ceptual modalities (Mandler, 2004, 2012).
Let’s try to clarify this concept. The basic idea is quite simple:
human beings from birth are able to recode selected aspects of
incoming perceptual data into an image-schematic form, map-
ping spatial structure onto conceptual structure (Mandler, 2004,
2012).
For example, an infant is able to develop the concept of
THING by identifying spatially coherent objects separate from
the environment. Then, he or she is able to develop the concept
of PATH—the image schema of a THING following a trajectory
in space—by seeing different objects going from one place to
another. In the same way the infant can create the concept of
CONTAINER by seeing different THINGS performing a PATH in
or out of another one.
This example (Mandler, 2008) underlines how image schemas
include schematic information, related to the spatial positions and
relations of objects. Apparently this content is the product of pro-
cessing in the dorsal visual stream and includes the specification of
the spatial relationships between the perceived objects (schematic
component), making use of metrical visual information from
an egocentric viewpoint (Milner and Goodale, 2008; Mandler,
2012).
As infants begin to manipulate objects and to move themselves
within the environment, they start to enrich this spatially based
representational system with perceptual information processed in
the ventral visual stream and medial temporal lobe, embodying
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the enduring characteristics of objects and their spatial relations
in an allocentric format (Byrne et al., 2007; Milner and Goodale,
2008; Mandler, 2012).
This information includes perceptual (mainly visual) infor-
mation representing objects (e.g., WHEELS, SEATS) and their
attributes (e.g., shape, contour, and size). Using the same
building-block approach discussed before, a toddler can develop
more complex concepts by joining together image schemas with
perceptual representations. For example the toddler may define
the concept of a CAR as a CONTAINER, with four WHEELS
and internal SEATS that can perform a PATH. Mandler (2010)
offers in his review a synthesis of the main studies supporting
this view.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to summarize the theory
and critical issues related to image schemas (for a broader view
please refer to these two Special Issues: (a) “Modalities of Social
Life: Roadmaps for an Embodied Social Psychology” published
in 2009 in the European Journal of Social Psychology; and (b)
“Embodied and Grounded Cognition” published in 2011 in the
Frontiers in Psychology). In this context we will focus only on the
consequences of this vision relevant to our discussion.
The main assumption, shared by many cognitive scientists, is
that our conceptual system is the result of the interaction of a dual
representation system (Galati et al., 2010): schematic (allocentric)
and perceptual (egocentric):
• The egocentric reference frame is referred to the body of the
subject and allows the location of objects relative to the body
center: within an egocentric reference frame we represent an
object relative to ourselves.
• The allocentric reference frame is instead referred to a space
external to the subject: within an allocentric reference frame an
object is represented independently of our own current relation
to it.
In this view, the role of the egocentric representations is
“pragmatic” (Jeannerod and Jacob, 2005): the representation of
an object using egocentric coordinates is required for reaching
and grasping. Instead, the role of allocentric representations is
“semantic” (Jeannerod and Jacob, 2005): the representation of
an object using allocentric coordinates is required for the visual
awareness of its size, shape, and orientation.
A recent experiment using direct human neural activity
recording from neurosurgical patients playing a virtual reality
memory game provides a first, but important, evidence of the
existence of image schema (Miller et al., 2013). In their study
Miller et al. (2013) found that place-responsive cells (schematic)
active during navigation were reactivated during the subsequent
recall of navigation-related objects using language.
In the study, subjects were asked to find their way around
a virtual world, delivering specific objects (e.g., a zucchini) to
certain addresses in that world (e.g., a bakery store). At the same
time, the researchers recorded the activity in the hippocampus
corresponding to specific groups of place cells selectively firing off
when the subject was in certain parts of the game map. Using these
brain recordings, the researchers were able to develop a neural
map that corresponded to the city’s layout in the hippocampus
of the subject.
Next, the subjects were asked to recall, verbally, as many of
the objects, in any order, they had delivered. Using the col-
lected neural maps, the researchers were able to cross- reference
each participant’s spatial memories as he/she accessed his/her
episodic memories of the delivered items (e.g., the zucchini).
The researchers found that when the subject named an item
that was delivered to a store in a specific region of the map the
place cell neurons associated with it reactivated before and during
vocalization.
This important experimental result suggests—as predicted by
image schema theory—that schematic and perceptual represen-
tations are integrated in situated conceptualizations that allows
us to represent and interpret the situation we are experienc-
ing (Barsalou, 2013). Once these situated conceptualizations are
assembled, they are stored in memory. When cued later, they
reinstate themselves through simulation within the respective
modalities producing pattern completion inferences (Barsalou,
2003).
In sum, as suggested by image schema theory, recalling an
episodic memory using language involves recovery of its spatial
context.
FROM THE BODY TO THE OTHERS AND BACK: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
One key characteristic of human beings is their sociality. But
how does social interaction modify the brain and in particular
its shaping of our bodily representations? Despite the influence
social interactions have in shaping the different components of
our experience of the body, this is an area that has traditionally
been ignored by neuroscience (Brugger et al., 2013). In particular,
neuroscience seems to forget that we are conscious of our own
body through experience of both its physicality—we perceive
our body as a physical object in the external world—and it
subjectivity—we experience our body through different neural
representations that are not related to its physical appearance
(Moseley and Brugger, 2009; Legrand, 2010).
Put differently, body representations may be differentiated
according to their first- and third-person characteristics. As
explained by Zwicker et al. (2012): “By first-person, we mean
those aspects of body awareness that are typically exclusively
available to the owner of the body—the self. By third-person,
we mean those aspects of body awareness and knowledge that
are at least potentially available to any observer” (p. 19). And as
shown by the phantom limb experience, first- and third-person
representations of the body can be different. More, we do not need
a body to experience it: we can experience a painful arm even after
its amputation.
However, the increasing interest of cognitive science and
social psychology in the study of the experience of the body
is providing a better picture of the process (Gallagher, 2005;
Tsakiris et al., 2010; Blanke, 2012; Slaughter and Brownell,
2012). First, these studies support the idea that body repre-
sentations play a central role in structuring cognition and the
self. For this reason, the experience of the body is strictly con-
nected to processes like cognitive development and autobiograph-
ical memory. Second, even though bodily self-consciousness is
apparently experienced by the subject as a unitary experience,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 236 | 3
Riva Cognitive neuroscience meets eating disorders
neuroimaging and neurological data suggest that it includes
different experiential layers—minimal selfhood, self location,
agency, whole body ownership, objectified self (Me) and body
satisfaction (Ideal Me)—that are integrated in a coherent expe-
rience (Crossley, 2001; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Blanke, 2012;
Shilling, 2012; Pfeiffer et al., 2013). In the following pages we
will suggest that these experiences are the outcome of differ-
ent subrepresentations of the body—body schema, the spatial
body, the active body, the personal body, the objectified body,
and the body image—that are progressively integrated in a
coherent and single representation through the subject’s inter-
action with the external and social world. Moreover, for each
subrepresentation it is possible to identify one or more spe-
cific disorders that alter the bodily experience of the subject
(Figure 1).
THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF OUR REPRESENTATION OF THE BODY
As underlined by Rochat (2012), an innate body model (“body
schema) allows at birth a primordial sense of embodied self-unity
(“selfhood”) in infants, providing the capacity for separating our
own embodied existence from the outside world: I’m present in a
body. According to Damasio (1999) this non conscious state (proto
self )—produced by a collection of neural patterns which are
representative of the internal body’s state—allows the detection,
moment by moment, of the physical changes which affect the
homeostasis of the organism.
A more complex body representation develops slowly, through
perception and action, over the first 3 or more years of life
(Tsakiris, 2012). Specifically, this innate body model is supported
by two online representations of the body (Ventre-Dominey et al.,
2003; Giummarra et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010). In the first 6 months
infants develop “the spatial body” (Self Location), produced by
the integration in an egocentric frame of afferent sensory infor-
mation (retinal, somesthetic, proprioceptive, vestibular, and audi-
tory). This new body model allows the experience of where “I” am
in space and that “I” perceive the world from there (Serino et al.,
2013). As demonstrated by the classical experiment by Bahrick
and Watson (1985) using contingent (live) and non contingent
(pre-recorded) first-person videos (from the waist down) of the
infant’s body, infants as young as 5 months of age are capable of
discriminating between contingent and non contingent image of
their own movements. Moreover, as demonstrated by different
studies, the spatiotemporal information included in the spatial
body allows infants to recognize different body parts, including
faces and hands (Bonatti et al., 2002).
Then, in the second 6 months of life, infants start to develop
“the active body”, produced by the integration of “the spa-
tial body” with efferent information (Slaughter and Brownell,
2012) relating to the movement of the body in space (visual-
proprioceptive integration). Within this representation toddlers
do not perceive visual and proprioceptive body information
separately, but as an integrated experience allowed by the per-
fect temporal correlation between proprioceptive (first-person)
and perceptual (third-person) information (Zwicker et al.,
2012).
From an experiential viewpoint this representation provides
to the self the sense of agency, the sense that we control our
own bodily actions. As demonstrated recently, even 4-month-old
infants are sensitive to the relationship between the form and the
motion of an agent and are able to integrate information about
form and motion during action observation (Grossmann et al.,
2013).
Counter-intuitively, however, these two body models are not
enough to provide a sense of whole-body ownership, the unitary
experience of owning a whole body (Tirassa et al., 2006; Tsakiris
et al., 2006, 2010; Petkova et al., 2011a,b).
First, Tsakiris et al. (2010) recently identified the brain areas
involved in body ownership and agency and found that they
are qualitatively different experiences, recruiting distinct brain
networks and triggered by different inputs. More, the brain areas
involved in the processing of body parts are different from the
ones integrating body parts in a full-body experience (Urgesi
et al., 2007).
A second explanation is given by the progressive maturation
of the specific brain regions involved in this experience: the tem-
poroparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefontal cortex. Using
a fMRI study with infants between 15 and 30 months Lewis
and Carmody found that the ability to reflect explicitly on self
was related to the progressive maturation of left TPJ (Lewis and
Carmody, 2008).
A third explanation is related to the lack of a whole-body
representation in infants (Slaughter and Brownell, 2012): while
young children are able to identify individual body parts by the
end of the first year, they do not have a reflective awareness of
the whole body until late in the second year of life, as indicated by
personal pronoun usage, mirror self-recognition and representing
their own and others’ behavior in pretense (Brownell et al., 2012).
Concluding a review of their recent studies in this field, Brownell
et al. underline (Brownell et al., 2012): “Our data suggest that
children first become aware of their individual body parts in
isolation from one another, then begin to represent their body as
an obstacle in relation to other things in the world, then become
able to consider their own body size explicitly, which is followed
by representing how their body parts are arranged in relation to
one another” (pp. 38–39):
In summary, the reflective experience of their own bodies in
infants (“the personal body”) is the outcome of a developmental
process happening between the 18th and 36th months of life: by
paying attention to their own and others’ body actions, infants
progressively integrate the different body locations into a whole
body representation characterized by a specific size and shape
(Brownell et al., 2007; Gilga and Southgate, 2012).
According to Damasio, the development of a whole-body
experience allows the appearance of the autobiographical self
(Damasio, 1999). In fact, this advanced self emerges only when—
to quote the book’s title—self comes to mind, so that in
key brain regions, the encoded experiences of past intersect
with the representational maps of whole-body sensory experi-
ence. A key characteristics of autobiograhical self is episodic
memory: a system which permits people to retrieve autobio-
graphical memories characterized by temporal, spatial, and self-
referential features—such as recalling having dinner with my
friends yesterday (Souchay et al., 2013). Interestingly, only by the
age of 3, children exhibit rudimentary episodic memory skills
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FIGURE 1 | Bodily self-consciousness and related disorders.
(Hayne and Imuta, 2011; Scarf et al., 2013): the ability to relate
WHAT happened WHERE and WHEN.
Developmental studies underline the critical role of imitation
in this process. In particular, through imitation infants develop
two different representations: an integrated knowledge of their
own body parts and actions and the map of this knowledge onto
their knowledge of the body parts and actions of others (Jones and
Yoshida, 2012). The final outcome of this second representation
is “the objectified body”, an objectified public representation of
our own body (Rochat, 2010): the body that others see, and more
importantly, that they judge and evaluate. From the subjective
side, the main experiential result is the “Objectified Self ” (Me),
the experience of the embodied self of being exposed and visible
to others within an intersubjective space (Rochat and Zahavi,
2011). The development of “the objectified body” is the outcome
of a long developmental process in which infants develop an
embodied self not only through their own body, but also through
how others perceive and represent it (Rochat, 2010; Rochat and
Zahavi, 2011; Rochat, 2012).
As noted originally by psychoanalysis (e.g., Freud’s con-
flict between Id and Ego), the development of “the objectified
body” is emotionally troubling for the individual. Rochat and
Zahavi (2011), commenting on the ideas formulated by Merleau-
Ponty on mirror self-experience, underline: “. . .the decisive and
unsettling impact of mirror self-recognition is not that I succeed
in identifying the mirror image as myself. Rather, what is at stake
here is the realization that I exist in an intersubjective space. I
am exposed and visible to others. When seeing myself in the
mirror, I am seeing myself as others see me. I am confronted
with the appearance I present to others. In fact, not only am I
seeing myself as others see me, I am also seeing myself as if I
was an other, i.e., I am adopting an alienating perspective on
myself. . . The me I see in the mirror is distant and yet close, it
is felt as another, and yet as myself. . . I cannot freely establish
a distance and perspective on it, as I can with other objects.
Indeed, I cannot get rid of my exteriority, my exposed surface”
(p. 209).
Together with the concept of the Me children develop the
concept of the Mine, the objectified sense of what belongs to
the embodied self (Rochat, 2010, 2012). The main outcome of
this process is reciprocity, a basic ingredient of human sociality
(Rochat, 2010): children now consider their own objects alienable
in the context of balanced social exchanges increasingly guided by
principles of reciprocity and inequality aversion.
As noted by Rochat, “Reciprocity requires a concept of self
that is enduring in a moral space made of consensual values and
norms, a space in which the child becomes accountable and in
which reputation starts to play a central role” (p. 743).
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The emergence of the Me and of the Mine, underlines the
critical role of culture in shaping our bodily experience: through
it a variety of social inputs constructs and revises our own
experience of the body. As suggested by psychologist Paul Schilder
(1950): “. . .the child takes parts of the bodies of others into its
own body-image. It also adopts in its own personality the attitude
taken by others towards parts of their own bodies. . . There exists
a deep community between one’s own body-image and the body-
image of others. In the construction of the body-image there is
a continual testing to discover what could be incorporated in the
body” (pp. 137, 218).
This concept has recently been demonstrated experimentally
(Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012): seeing someone else’s face being
touched simultaneously as one’s own face produces changes both
in the mental representation of one’s identity, and the perceived
similarity of others. Although the influence of others’ bodies on
our bodily experience is facilitated by vision and touch, real-life
encounters with other people are not mandatory (Brugger et al.,
2013).
Language and cultural practices, too, may have a direct impact
on our experience of the body. In his classic paper “Techniques
of the Body”, Mauss argued that cultures develop elaborate
techniques of the body—highly developed body actions that
embody the characteristics of a culture—which provide social
actors with identities to conform to, rituals to perform, and other
mundane activities to engage in (Mauss, 1973).
According to Shilling (2012), Western culture took another
step forward, transforming the body into a symbolic project to
be worked at and accomplished as part of the self-identity of the
subject: “treating the body as a project. . .involves practical recog-
nition of the significance of bodies as both personal resources and
social symbols. . .Bodies become malleable entities to be shaped
and honed by the hard work of their owners” (p. 7).
In this view the comparison/integration of “the objectified
body” with an ideal societal body, expression of institutional
norms and values, is a critical social and developmental process
(Thompson, 1996; Thompson et al., 1999). Its main outcome
is a new bodily representation—“body image”—that integrates
the objectified representation of the personal body with the ideal
societal body (the Ideal Me).
On one hand, by suggesting specific physical features the ideal
societal body allows a formal adherence of the self to the rules and
expectations of the society in which he or she lives. Specifically,
individuals can decide to shape their physical bodies accordingly,
to express agreement with embedded social norms. Plastic surgery
is a classic example of a tool allowing individuals to reconstruct
their bodies according to the social norms and expectations
(Sarwer et al., 1998). On the other hand, the contents of “body
image” shape body-related self-perceptions and self-attitudes,
including thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In particular, the
main experiential outcome is “body satisfaction/dissatisfaction”,
or how individuals feel about their bodies (Neumark-Sztainer,
2005).
Various studies suggest that body image, if present, is only
rudimentary in children under 4 years (Smolak, 2012; Kerkez
et al., 2013). If preschool girls (4-to-6 years old) demonstrate
anti-fat bias and social comparison, body dissatisfaction and
dieting are clearly evident only among elementary school-age girls
(Smolak, 2012). Moreover, its development is strictly related to
two different processes: the acquisition of advanced allocentric
spatial memory abilities (Ribordy et al., 2013) and the emergence
of autobiographical memory (Pathman et al., 2013).
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF OUR
BODILY REPRESENTATIONS
In the presented model the six representations are both implicit
and explicit, and coded in a dual format (see Figure 1): ego-
centric (spatial body, active body, and personal body), allocen-
tric (body schema, objectified body, and body image). Usually,
the interaction between the egocentric and allocentric frames
is limited (Longo et al., 2010): the experience of our moving
body happens in a transient action-oriented egocentric perceptual
frame, while our long-term memory of the body size is stored
in an enduring allocentric environment–object representation
(Burgess, 2006). Nevertheless, there is a permeability between
them, allowing their interaction. Rossetti et al. (2005) underline
that “several types of interaction can be observed between body
image and body schema. Several techniques used to alleviate
unilateral neglect produce a direct effect on body schema but
nevertheless positively affect body image as well. In addition,
the link demonstrated between the improvement of anosognosia
and hemiplegia suggests that body schema and body image
are tightly linked. It is concluded that dynamical and two-way
dynamical interactions rather than simple static hierarchical links
govern the relationships between body schema and body image”
(p. 111).
But how do they interact? As suggested by Byrne et al. (2007)
“Long-term spatial memory is modeled as attractor dynamics
within medial temporal allocentric representations, and short-
term memory is modeled as egocentric parietal representations
driven by perception, retrieval, and imagery and modulated by
directed attention. Both encoding and retrieval/imagery require
translation between egocentric and allocentric representations,
which are mediated by posterior parietal and retrosplenial areas
and the use of head direction representations in Papez’s circuit”
(p. 340).
Recently, Seidler et al. (2012) demonstrated the role
played by working memory in two different types of motor
skill learning—sensorimotor adaptation and motor sequence
learning—confirming a critical involvement of this memory in
the above interaction process. In general the interaction between
egocentric perception and allocentric data happens through the
episodic buffer of the working memory and involves all three of
its components (Baddeley, 2012; Wen et al., 2013): verbal, spatial,
and visuo-tactile.
Giudice et al. (2013) recently demonstrated that the processing
of spatial representations in working memory is not influenced by
its source—either perceptual or schematic. It is even possible to
combine long-term memory data with perceptual images within
an active spatial representation without influencing judgments of
spatial relations.
A recent hypothesis is that these different representations
can be integrated within the episodic buffer into an amodal
(once formed, it no longer retains modality-specific information)
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spatial representational format shared by both perceptual and
linguistic knowledge (Bryant, 1997; Loomis et al., 2007; Kelly and
Avraamides, 2011; Wolbers et al., 2011; Baddeley, 2012). Both
Bryant and Loomis identified this representational format in a
three-dimensional coordinate system (Loomis et al., 2002, 2007;
Bryant, 1997), available in the working memory, able to receive its
contents both from multiple sensory input modalities (vision, tac-
tile, etc.) and from multiple long-term memory contents (vision,
language, etc.).
From an experiential viewpoint this amodal spatial repre-
sentation may have two roles (Giudice et al., 2013): on one
hand, it allows the control of action when the source stimulus is
temporarily interrupted or removed; on the other hand it allows
for the active imagining of layouts and the performing of mental
transformations on them.
A SUMMARY OF THE KEY POINTS
After this long discussion we can summarize some key points that
are relevant for a better understanding of EDs.
• Our conceptual system is the result of the interaction of a dual
representation system—schematic (allocentric) and perceptual
(egocentric): these representations are integrated in situated
conceptualizations that allow us to represent and interpret the
situation we are experiencing. When cued later, for example
through language, they reinstate themselves through simula-
tions within the respective modalities, producing pattern com-
pletion inferences (Barsalou, 2003).
• Our experience of the body is tightly integrated within a bodily
self-consciousness that offers a single but layered experience of
one’s body and oneself : traditionally clinical research in EDs has
studied separately the effects of the pathology on the different
components of the experience of the body (i.e., body image
and body schema). However, if we want to get the full picture
we must remember that first, the bodily experiential layers are
not two but six: minimal selfhood, self location, agency, whole-
body ownership, objectified self, and body satisfaction; second,
we do not experience these layers separately except in some
neurological disorders; third, there is a natural, intermodal
communication between them; and fourth, changes in one
component can educate and inform other ones (Gallagher,
2005).
• The different pathologies involving the different bodily represen-
tations suggest a critical role of the brain in the experience of
the body: these pathologies indicate that the brain does more
than just detect and analyze sensory inputs; it may override
and neglect sensory inputs or generate experience even in the
absence of external inputs.
• Our bodily experience evolves over time through the integration
of different representations of the body, both allocentric and
egocentric: first, perception and action extend the minimal
selfhood (body schema) existing at birth through two more
online representations: “the spatial body”, produced by the
integration in an egocentric frame of afferent sensory infor-
mation, and “the active body”, produced by the integration
of “the spatial body” with efferent information relating to the
movement of the body in space. Then, through the maturation
of the underlying neural networks and the progressive increase
of mutual social exchanges, the embodied self is extended by
further representations: “the personal body”, integrating the
different body locations in a whole body representation; “the
objectified body”, the integration of the objectified public rep-
resentations of the personal body; the “body image”, integrating
the objectified representation of the personal body with the
ideal societal body.
• The evolution of our bodily experience is related to perspective
shifts, from allocentric to egocentric representations and vice
versa: in the ontogenetic development of our bodily self-
consciousness it is possible to identify a clear evolutive path
related to the ability of the subject in performing a more and
more sophisticated shift from an egocentric to an allocentric
perspective and vice versa: from the performing of spatial
motor actions in the near space to their planning in the far
space (from the here and now to there and future); from my
body to the other one (from self to other); from the real-
time experience of the body to the meaning of my body (from
soma to psyche); from the meaning of my body to the social
meaning of a body (from individual to social). A possible
hypothesis, that we will discuss in the next pages, is that such
fundamental reframing of the experience of the body and the
self has a deep, if poorly understood, link with the etiology
of EDs.
FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCES TO EATING DISORDERS
AN ALLOCENTRIC VIEW OF OUR BODIES: THE OBJECTIFICATION
THEORY
A popular socio-cultural model of EDs that clearly suggests the
relevance of perspective shifts in the etiology of these distur-
bances is the “objectification theory”. Introduced by Fredrickson
and Roberts (1997), this theory suggests that our culture
imposes a specific orientational model—self-objectification—
defining women’s behavioral and emotional responses (Calogero
et al., 2010; Dakanalis et al., 2012; Riva et al., 2014). At its simplest,
the objectification theory holds that (1) there exist an objectified
societal ideal of beauty (within a particular culture) that is (2)
transmitted via a variety of sociocultural channels. This ideal is
then (3) internalized by individuals, so that (4) satisfaction (or
dissatisfaction) with appearance will be a function of the extent
to which individuals do (or do not) meet the ideal prescription
(Tiggemann, 2011).
Specifically, women are taught to adopt a self-objectified view
of themselves as bodies—focussing more on the Me and the Ideal
Me than to the I—to meet Western cultural ideals of physical
appearance and attractiveness (Fredrickson and Roberts, 1997;
Daniel and Bridges, 2010). Using self-objectification to orient
themselves in our society, women use body and appearance as
their core basis of self-evaluation, with self-worth contingent on
meeting the body shape ideals.
According to Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) repeated expe-
riences of sexual objectification—when women are treated as
bodies that exist for the use and pleasure of others—influence
women to gradually adopt an observer’s perspective of their
physical self; that is, they begin to treat themselves as an object
to be looked at and evaluated on the basis of physical appearance
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(the Me). The self is so defined in terms of how the body appears
to others.
The internalization of an observer’s perspective on one’s own
body is labelled as “self-objectification” (Riva et al., 2014) and
reduces a woman’s worth to her perception of her body’s sem-
blance to cultural standards of attractiveness (Dakanalis and
Riva, 2013b). Self-objectification is typically manifested as per-
sistent body surveillance or habitual monitoring of the body’s
outward appearance and is theorized to lead to a number of
negative experiential consequences such as body shame, social
physique anxiety, lack of awareness of internal bodily states, and
decreased peak motivational states/flow experiences (Dakanalis
et al., 2014a).
The link between self-objectification and EDs is supported by
different correlational and longitudinal studies showing a direct
link between ED symptomatology and self-objectification, body
surveillance, and the internalization of sociocultural standards of
beauty (Moradi and Huang, 2008).
A possible criticism to this vision is that males, who appar-
ently are less prone to self-objectification, also experience EDs.
However, different studies also underline the possible role of self-
objectification in the etiology of male EDs (Dakanalis et al., 2012,
2013a,b, 2014b). Specifically in males, self-objectification is man-
ifested as body surveillance (Dakanalis and Riva, 2013a). As in
women, frequent body surveillance increases attention to disliked
body parts, thereby encouraging the use of maladaptive eating and
body shape regulation behaviors to modify the body (Calogero,
2009; Wooldridge and Lytle, 2012). More, body surveillance is
strongly related to muscle dysmorphia (the belief in oneself
appearing small and skinny, despite well-developed musculature),
a male disturbance having symptomatic similarities with AN
(Cafri et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, only a small subset of all the female and male
subjects exposed to idealized body models develops clinically
diagnosable EDs (Thompson et al., 1999). Why? A possible
answer to this question is offered by the Allocentric Lock
Hypothesis.
THE ALLOCENTRIC LOCK HYPOTHESIS
The primary claim of the “Allocentric Lock Hypothesis” (Riva,
2007, 2011, 2012; Riva and Gaudio, 2012; Riva et al., 2012;
Gaudio and Riva, 2013) is that individuals with EDs may be
locked to an “objectified body” that is no longer updated by
contrasting egocentric representations driven by perception. This
claim is based on the following assumptions (see Figure 2) that
are commented and justified in the next paragraphs:
• Subjects in their social interactions develop a specific “body
image” that defines the meaning of our objectified body. The
content of the body image is related to cultural standard. For
example, this may include “fat phobia” (fear of becoming fat)
in Western countries, or “weight phobia” (fear of becoming
mature) in Asian countries (Lee, 1995).
• In Western countries the value of the objectified body is
defined more by observable body attributes (e.g., “How do I
look?”—allocentric perspective), rather than by privileged, or
nonobservable body attributes (e.g., “What am I capable of?”
“How do I feel?”—egocentric perspective).
• The endorsement and acceptance of appearance media ideals
lead subjects to become aware of how their bodies looks and to
evaluate themselves in terms of physical appearance. This eval-
uation becomes body surveillance, the tendency to be highly
vigilant of one’s appearance (Fitzsimmons and Bardone-Cone,
2011).
• Subjects who experience one or more personal (e.g., “The new
jeans were too tight”) or social (e.g., teasing) situations in which
they fail to meet physical appearance standards, then update
the objectified body accordingly (van den Berg et al., 2007):
e.g., “My body is fat”. As demonstrated by different studies,
including a recent meta-analysis (Menzel et al., 2010; Makinen
et al., 2012), this produces body dissatisfaction, defined as
displeasure with some aspect of one’s appearance (Cash and
Pruzinski, 2004).
• Body dissatisfaction has a critical effect on eating behavior:
subjects go on diet to improve the satisfaction with their body.
According to the data collected by Ogden et al. from 8165
children and adolescents living in the United States (Ogden
et al., 2008) about 62% of girls aged 12–19 report that they are
trying to lose weight.
• Normally, after a successful diet, subjects experience a thinner
body and again modify their objectified body accordingly (e.g.,
“I’m no more fat”). According to the Allocentric Lock theory,
however, subjects with EDs are locked into their negative
objectified body: its content cannot be updated even after a
demanding diet and a significant weight loss.
• The impossibility of meeting societal standards transforms
body dissatisfaction into body shame: the painful social emo-
tion that can result from measuring oneself against a cultural
standard and perceiving oneself as being judged and seen as
inferior, defective or unattractive in the eyes of others (Pinto-
Gouveia and Matos, 2011; Dakanalis et al., 2014a).
• Body shame usually has two behavioral effects: subjects either
start more radical dieting behaviors—such as the use of diet
pills and self-induced vomiting—or, at the opposite, decide to
stop any form of food control and start “disinhibited” eating
behaviors (Van Strien et al., 2009). In particular, as samurai
committed seppuku to remove shame, subjects are ready to
use the most extreme weight reduction techniques—fasting,
vomiting, laxatives, etc.—to achieve the same result.
• A variety of studies show that shame experiences are also
recorded in autobiographical memory, influencing body image
and self-relevant beliefs, inattentional and emotional process-
ing (Pinto-Gouveia and Matos, 2011). As demonstrated by
numerous studies, in patients with EDs, the representation
of the body included in the shame-inducing negative emo-
tional event produces a priming effect on any body-related
experience (Goldfein et al., 2000; Blechert et al., 2011): on
one side, the tendency of our perception to be affected by
our recurring thoughts produces an attentional bias on body
related stimuli; on the other side, it draws the subject’s attention
to previously stored body image stimuli biasing egocentric
perceptual data and the interpretation of future self-relevant
events.
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FIGURE 2 | From culture to eating disorders.
• Specifically, shame experiences are retrieved in observer per-
spective, a way of remembering in which the subject “sees” the
self engaged in the event as an observer would. During observer
perspective patients shut down the neural circuitry in the insula
switching off the real-time experience of the body: they are out
of their body.
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The next sections will deepen these points by detailing the pos-
sible causal processes leading to the development of the allocentric
lock.
A CULTURE OF DIETERS
As discussed before, according to the objectification theory in
Western countries the value of the objectified body is defined
more by observable body attributes (e.g., “How do I look?”—
allocentric perspective), rather than by privileged, or nonobserv-
able body attributes (e.g., “What am I capable of?” “How do I
feel?”—egocentric perspective). Is this true? As demonstrated by
a meta-analysis on 77 studies this approach defines the value of
our objectified body (positive or negative) and the actions related
to it (Grabe et al., 2008): its findings provide strong support for
the relationships between media and internalization of the thin
ideal as well as between media and women’s eating behaviors and
beliefs.
The endorsement and acceptance of appearance media ideals
lead subjects to become aware of how their bodies look and
to evaluate themselves in terms of physical appearance. This
evaluation becomes body surveillance, the tendency to be highly
vigilant of one’s appearance (Fitzsimmons and Bardone-Cone,
2011). Why? According to McKinley and Hyde constant surveil-
lance is needed to ensure that the subject complies with cultural
body standards and avoids negative judgments (Fitzsimmons and
Bardone-Cone, 2011). Seemingly, when one is concerned with
weight/shape one would continue to survey the body with the
hopes of monitoring and reducing those discrepancies.
Subjects who experience one or more personal (e.g., “The new
jeans were too tight”) or social (e.g., teasing) situations in which
they fail to meet physical appearance standards, then update the
objectified body accordingly (van den Berg et al., 2007): e.g.,
“My body is fat” (see Figure 3). As demonstrated by different
studies, including a recent meta-analysis (Menzel et al., 2010;
Makinen et al., 2012), this produces body dissatisfaction, defined
as displeasure with some aspect of one’s appearance (Cash and
Pruzinski, 2004). Three recent large community-based studies on
normal subjects showed that the proportion of adolescent girls
reporting body dissatisfaction is about one out of two (Makinen
et al., 2012).
Cultural assumptions about weight include the belief that diets
offer women relief from dissatisfaction with body size (Nell and
Fredrickson, 1998). According to the data collected by Ogden et al.
from 8165 children and adolescents living in the United States
(Ogden et al., 2008) about 33% of girls aged 12–19 years are
overweight. However, nearly double that percentage of girls (62%)
report that they are trying to lose weight.
STORING AND UPDATING A BODY RELATED EXPERIENCE
As we have seen, one or more personal or social event in which the
subject fails to meet physical appearance standards can modify the
objectified body. But how does it happen?
Although our brain includes thousands of episodic memories,
only some of them are included in autobiographical memories
and are relevant to the self. According to Sutin and Robins (2008),
“the critical defining feature for autobiographical memory is the
importance of the information to one’s sense of self and one’s life
history” (p. 1389).
Specifically, Conway (2005) suggested that autobiographical
memory tries to construct and maintain a coherent self over time:
when an autobiographical knowledge is retrieved, its content is
continually evaluated by control processes to ensure that it is
consistent with the individual’s current self-goals. According to
Sutin and Robins (2008): the process involves the following (see
Figure 3):
• To evaluate if the memory is relevant to the self : this evaluation,
which may be implicit or explicit, compares the retrieved
contents to the different representations of actual, ideal, and
possible selves.
• To evaluate if the memory is in agreement or not with the self : this
evaluation compares the self in the memory with the current
self to verify the level of congruence (it is similar or differ-
ent from the current self) and threat (it supports or reduces
self-esteem).
In this view, the memory that the new pair of jeans were too
tight, if related to the thin ideal, may be highly relevant to the
self. However, what happens when an individual has a memory of
herself that is congruent but threating for the self, like this one?
Swann et al. (2003) define this situation “a cognitive-
affective crossfire”: the memory is cognitively congruent with
the self but emotionally inconsistent with the need to main-
tain self-esteem. The cognitive-affective crossfire literature sug-
gests that, in this situation, cognitive consistency tends to
“win” over self-esteem enhancement. For example, subjects with
low self-esteem prefer feedback congruent with their negative
self-views to positive feedback inconsistent with their selves
(Swann et al., 1987). More, a process of self-verification is acti-
vated to seek information that is consistent with the self-view
(Swann et al., 2003). In sum, episodic memories of similar rel-
evant experiences may produce an automatic, gradual updat-
ing of self-knowledge (Beike and Ransom, 2012). However, this
process feeds into an implicit rather than explicit view of the
self.
Another possibility is that the memory becomes available
through a conscious decision process of self-perception: the indi-
vidual, after examining the new event—the new pair of jeans were
too tight—and considering the situation in which it occurred,
comes to a conclusion about his/her self-knowledge—e.g., “My
body is fat”.
The process also works in the opposite way. For example, after
fitting into the pair of tight skinny jeans again, the individual can
conclude that her body is now okay (see Figure 3).
This process is carried out through the interaction between
the “working self ” and the autobiographical memory knowledge
base (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). The
working self is a temporary activation of current goals that con-
strain the search for elements to be bound up in the working
memory. During the process of self-perception, the working self-
retrieves the relevant memory (e.g., “My legs are fat”) from the
autobiographical memory knowledge base and updates it with the
perceptual data available in the working memory (e.g., “I now can
fit into the Jeans, so I don’t have a fat body anymore”).
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FIGURE 3 | Updating the contents of episodic memory.
As discussed before, this process requires that the available rep-
resentations share the same code. In other words, the schematic
(allocentric) contents of the retrieved memory have to be trans-
lated into perceptual (egocentric) data. Recently, Burgess et al.
(2001) and Byrne et al. (2007) proposed a model to explain this
process. The allocentric representation (defining scene elements
in terms of north, south east, west) is translated into an egocentric
representation (defining scene elements in terms of left, right,
ahead of the individual) by the retrosplenial cortex (RSC), with
involvement of other cells: the place cells informing viewpoint
location, the head-direction cells orienting the viewing direction,
and the grid cells interpreting the self-motion signals. If, for some
reason, this process is impaired, the subject is no longer able to
update the representation of the body stored in the autobiograph-
ical memory. He/she is locked to it.
THE ALLOCENTRIC LOCK AND ITS CAUSES
The main tenet of the “Allocentric Lock Hypothesis” is that indi-
viduals EDs may be locked to an “objectified body” that is no
longer updated by contrasting egocentric representations driven
by perception (Riva, 2012; Riva and Gaudio, 2012).
There are various studies supporting this hypothesis. Foster
et al., who assessed 59 obese women before, during, and after
48 weeks of weight loss treatment found that changes in the
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objectified body and in body dissatisfaction were not related to
changes in weight (Foster et al., 1997). In a recent study, Guardia
et al. (2013b) observed an altered representation of the body in
a bariatric patient: the patient experienced a wider body even
after a successful weight reduction (before: 125 Kg; after: 60 Kg).
On one hand, this outcome is not uncommon and has also been
found in about 30% of the patients experiencing laparoscopic
adjustable gastric banding (Dakanalis et al., 2013c). On the other
hand, Kaly et al. (2008) found a significant difference between
what weight-loss clinicians and obese patients consider success-
ful following bariatric surgery. As a general guideline, bariatric
surgery is considered successful when 50% of excess weight is
lost. However, most obese patients considered disappointing a
49% +/− 14% excess body weight loss, the gold standard for
clinicians. Moreover, these results have some similarities with
another recent work by Guardia et al. with anorectic patients
(Guardia et al., 2012): in their study the patients experienced
a wider body, and the magnitude of the overestimation was
correlated with the size of the patient’s body prior to disease
onset.
But why? Available research is not yet able to answer this
question. Here, we suggest two possible causes of this lock:
endogenous and exogenous. A possible endogenous cause is
a structural and/or functional vulnerability of the brain areas
involved in the egocentric/allocentric encoding process. Different
recent neuroimaging studies revealed relevant brain alterations
(Riva and Gaudio, 2012; Gaudio and Riva, 2013) in the key areas
of both the core regions of the allocentric/egocentric frames and
the core region of the egocentric frame (i.e., the precuneus and
the inferior parietal lobe). Interestingly, such areas are affected in
the early stages of AN (Gaudio et al., 2011) and are mainly related
to the perceptive component of body image distortion (Gaudio
and Quattrocchi, 2012). This possibility is also in line with the
dysregulation in the anterior ventral striatal pathway suggested by
Kaye et al. (2009, 2013).
A possible exogenous cause is an excessive level of stress.
Different researchers recently suggested the influence of inter-
personal problems (Hartmann et al., 2010), chronic stress, and
post-traumatic stress on the onset of EDs (Troop et al., 1998;
Sassaroli and Ruggiero, 2005; Rojo et al., 2006; Hepp et al.,
2007; Lo Sauro et al., 2008). Recent research underlines the role
of anxiety and stress in influencing the brain areas involved
in the egocentric/allocentric transformation (Vyas et al., 2002;
McLaughlin et al., 2007). The endogenous cholinergic tone in
the dorsal hippocampus decreases with increases in anxiety and
is associated with an increase in the serotonergic tone (File et al.,
2000).
Further, a growing body of evidence has demonstrated that
stress, and in particular chronic stress, can cause hippocampal
damage (Vyas et al., 2002; McLaughlin et al., 2007), apparently
through the excessive activity exerted by the amygdala on the hip-
pocampus (Kim and Diamond, 2002). Specifically, chronic stress
produces consistent and reversible changes within the dendritic
arbors of CA3 hippocampal neurons (Conrad, 2006; McLaughlin
et al., 2007), characterized by decreased dendritic length and
reduced branch number. This process disrupts hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activity, leading to dysregulated
glucocorticoid release that, combined with hippocampal CA3
dendritic retraction, contributes to impaired spatial memory
(Conrad, 2006).
Interestingly, a study demonstrated that the visual perspective
for autobiographical memories was predicted by a gene × envi-
ronment interaction between a polymorphism of the serotonin-
transporter-linked promoter region (5-HTTLPR) and life stress
exposure (Lemogne et al., 2009).
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLOCENTRIC LOCK ON EATING
BEHAVIOR
The impossibility of meeting societal standards transforms body
dissatisfaction into body shame: the painful social emotion that
can result from measuring oneself against a cultural standard and
perceiving oneself as being judged and seen as inferior, defective
or unattractive in the eyes of others (Pinto-Gouveia and Matos,
2011; Dakanalis et al., 2014a).
Theoretical accounts of shame hold that this emotion occurs
from global attributions of failure (Nell and Fredrickson, 1998):
failure is attributed to the self (e.g., “I am a bad person”), even
if it is the result of a specific action of the self (e.g., “I did
something bad) or just the intention of doing it (e.g., “I’m going
to do something bad). An example of this effect is the “thought-
shape fusion” effect found in many anorectic and bulimic patients
(Kostopoulou et al., 2013): it occurs when the thought about
eating a forbidden food (e.g., a high calorie food like dark choco-
late) increases a person’s estimate of her weight/shape, elicits a
perception of moral wrongdoing and makes her feel fat (i.e., “If
I think about overeating or eating prohibited foods, then I think
that I may have gained weight/I am immoral/I feel myself as
fatter”).
In sum shame, including body shame, is accompanied by a
sense of worthlessness and powerlessness that make it the more
painful and “destructive” social emotion with a critical role in
the development of different psychopathologies (Pinto-Gouveia
and Matos, 2011). In fact, feelings of shame are more likely to
motivate desire to hide or escape the shame-inducing situation,
to sink into the floor and disappear (Cavalera and Pepe, 2014).
As demonstrated by seppuku (harakiri—ritual suicide by cutting
one’s own belly with a sword), individuals are ready even to lose
their lives to remove shame: if you were samurai and lost your
honor, harakiri was the only way to preserve it.
Body shame usually has two behavioral effects: subjects either
start more radical dieting behaviors—such as the use of diet pills
and self-induced vomiting—or, at the opposite, decide to stop
any form of food control and start “disinhibited” eating behaviors
(Van Strien et al., 2009). In particular, as samurai committed sep-
puku to remove shame, subjects are ready to use the most extreme
weight reduction techniques—fasting, vomiting, laxatives, etc.—
to achieve the same result.
The link between body shame and weight-disorder symptoma-
tology has been verified by several authors. For example, Burney
and Irwin found in a sample of 97 Australian women that shame
associated with eating behavior was the strongest predictor of the
severity of eating-disorder symptomatology (Burney and Irwin,
2000). Neumark-Sztainer et al. (2006), discussed the results of
the Project EAT II (Eating Among Teens), a longitudinal study
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involving 2,516 ethnically and socioeconomically diverse ado-
lescents. They report that, 5 years later, the use of unhealthful
weight-control behaviors increased by six times the risk for binge
eating with loss of control, three times the risk for being over-
weight, and two to five times the risk for extreme weight-control
behaviors. A similar result was found by Stice et al. (2008a): in a
different longitudinal study fasting was the best predictor for the
future onset, 5 years later, of binge eating and BN.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLOCENTRIC LOCK ON SELF AND THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE BODY
A variety of studies show that shame experiences are also recorded
in autobiographical memory, influencing body image and self-
relevant beliefs, inattentional and emotional processing (Pinto-
Gouveia and Matos, 2011). How and Why?
Events of the personal history may be remembered using two
different viewpoints (Robinson and Swanson, 1993; Rice and
Rubin, 2009). The rememberer may “see” the event through
his/her own eyes as in normal perception (field mode), or “see” the
self-engaged in the event as an observer would (observer mode).
The observer perspective is associated with a memory image
focusing on the remembered self, whereas the field perspective
focuses on the surrounding context (Frank and Gilovich, 1989).
Different studies suggest that, if healthy subjects tend to
retrieve autobiographical memories in field perspective, many
clinical samples preferentially remember personal events using
an observer perspective. For example, Wells and Papageorgiou
(1999) found that, in recalling anxiety-provoking social situa-
tions, individuals with social phobia and agoraphobia are more
likely to take an observer perspective whereas control subjects
are more likely to take a field perspective. A similar result was
obtained by Bergouignan et al. (2008), in a sample of depressed
patients, and by Osman et al. (2004) in a sample of patients
with body dysmorphic disorder. Commenting these data Eich
et al. suggest that shame-inducing negative emotional events are
retrieved in observer perspective (Eich et al., 2012). In agree-
ment with this, Bernstein et al. conclude (Berntsen et al., 2003):
“increased access to the trauma memory and its role as a land-
mark leads to vivid and intrusive memories and over-inclusive
classifications of other non-traumatic memories as related to the
trauma. This is likely to generate a need by the traumatized person
for distancing him- or herself from the phenomenological painful
reliving and thus motivate the use of an observer perspective in
remembering” (p. 690).
But what are the differences between field and observer modes
of remembering?
A functional magnetic resonance imaging study demonstrated
a different activation of the neural networks engaged with field
versus observer memories for real-world events (Eich et al., 2009).
The results revealed significant decreases in bilateral insula and
left somatic motor activity during the recall of observer memories,
suggesting a significant reduction in one’s cortical representations
of the physical, embodied self. In other words, observer autobio-
graphical memories have some similarities with the out-of-body
experience (Blanke et al., 2004): “an experience in which a person
seems to be awake and to see his body and the world from a
location outside the physical body” (p. 243).
Commenting these results Eich et al. underline (Eich et al.,
2012): “these findings have a number of interesting implications,
both in the memory domain and beyond. For one, the data
suggest that adopting an observer perspective is tantamount to
a literal disembodiment at the neural level. That is, when we
choose to relive past events from a perspective outside our body,
we shut down the neural circuitry in the insula that is central
for monitoring our bodies’ internal states. For another, research
in social cognitive neuroscience has revealed that not only do
we have a conceptual representation of “self ” in the brain, but
that it’s critical for how we process events in the external world.
Building on this idea, our findings indicate that self-referential
processing can also include a physical or somatic sense of self that
is distinct from any conceptual or abstract self-representation”
(p. 177).
According to Berntsen and Rubin (2006, 2007) the memory of
a shame-inducing negative emotional event can become central
to one’s life story and identity: through rumination, a recurring
perseverative thought about the event (Connolly et al., 2014),
the memory becomes highly interconnected with other types of
autobiographical information in the cognitive networks of a per-
son. This includes an understanding of the memory as a reference
point for everyday inferences and for generating expectations, as
a turning point in the life story and as a central component of
identity (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006, 2007).
As demonstrated by numerous studies, in patients with EDs,
the relevance given to the representation of the body included in
the shame-inducing negative emotional event produces a priming
effect on any body-related experience (Goldfein et al., 2000;
Blechert et al., 2011).
On one side, the tendency of our perception to be affected
by our recurring thoughts produces an attentional bias on
body related stimuli. For example, the Stroop effects found for
body/shape stimuli in AN patients (Dobson and Dozois, 2004),
and the lower pressure detection threshold AN patients have
on their abdomen (Keizer et al., 2012), apparently support this
interpretation: anorectic individuals selectively attend to body
stimuli because they represent their greater psychological threat
(Dobson and Dozois, 2004).
On the other side, it draws the subject’s attention to the con-
tents of the stored body image. More, the need for distancing him-
or herself from a painful reliving motivate the use of a perspective
outside our body. This switches off the neural circuitry used to
monitor our bodies’ internal states (Eich et al., 2012) and biases
egocentric perceptual data.
For example, in a recent study Guardia et al. (2013a). Eval-
uated spatial orientation constancy and the perception of body
orientation in AN patients. They suggest that the poor perception
of orientation can be related to lack of awareness of interoceptive
signals (Guardia et al., 2013a). This result is in agreement with the
study by Pollatos et al. (2008) assessing the perception of intero-
ceptive sensitivity in AN. Their findings showed that interoceptive
accuracy, as measured by a heart beat perception task, is reduced
in AN patients (Pollatos et al., 2008).
More, Case et al. used a size–weight illusion (SWI; Berntsen
and Rubin, 2007;—Subject experience the SWI when underesti-
mating the weight of a larger object when compared to a smaller
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object of identical shape and weight) battery to compare visuo-
haptic integration in anorectic and healthy females (Case et al.,
2012). The authors found that the ability to discriminate weight
did not differ between anorectic and control subjects. At the same
time, subjects with anorexia showed a reduced SWI compared
to controls. These results suggest that anorectics have a greater
reliance on sensorimotor/proprioceptive memory compared to a
reduced reliance on visual input in judgments of weight.
In a different study, Blechert et al. found that ED patients
associate shape/weight concerns with the non-appearance-
related domains of interpersonal relationships and achieve-
ment/performance (Blechert et al., 2011).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Even if the debate about the etiology of EDs is still open, clinical
psychology is starting to explain EDs as the outcome of the
interaction between cognitive, socio-emotional, and interper-
sonal elements. In particular, two influential models—the revised
cognitive-interpersonal maintenance model and the transdi-
agnostic cognitive behavioral theory—identified possible key
predisposing and maintaining factors (Schmidt and Treasure,
2006; Fairburn, 2008; Cooper and Fairburn, 2011; Treasure and
Schmidt, 2013).
These models, even if very influential and able to provide clear
suggestions for therapy, still are not able to answer to two critical
questions: why do not all the individuals with either obsessive-
compulsive features or with a dysfunctional scheme for self-
evaluation develop an ED? What is the role of the body experience
in the etiology of these disorders?
In this paper, we suggested that the path for a meaningful
answer requires the integration of these models with the different
outcomes of cognitive neuroscience. First, we underlined the crit-
ical role of the body in the development of our cognitive systems.
In particular, our conceptual system is the result of the interaction
of a dual-representation system (Galati et al., 2010)—schematic
(allocentric) and perceptual (egocentric)—strictly related to the
possibility of the body of interacting with the world: the repre-
sentation of an object using egocentric coordinates is required
for reaching and grasping; the representation of an object using
allocentric coordinates is required for the visual awareness of its
size, shape, and orientation.
Second, we suggested that our bodily experience evolves in
time by integrating within the body image schema six different
representations of the body—body schema, the spatial body, the
active body, the personal body, the objectified body, and the body
image—that are progressively developed through the subject’s
interaction with the external and social world. Specifically, these
bodily representations allow different experiences—minimal self-
hood, self location, agency, whole body ownership, objectified self
(Me) and body satisfaction (Ideal Me) that shape and enhance our
bodily self-consciousness.
Third, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997), with their “objectifica-
tion theory”, identified a specific cultural model that defines indi-
viduals’ behavioral and emotional responses in relation to their
own body (Calogero et al., 2010; Dakanalis et al., 2012). Within
this model, individuals are taught to adopt a self-objectified view
of themselves as bodies to meet Western cultural ideals of physical
appearance and attractiveness (Fredrickson and Roberts, 1997;
Daniel and Bridges, 2010). Using self-objectification to orient
themselves, women use body and appearance as their core basis of
self-evaluation, with self-worth contingent on meeting the body
shape ideals.
The link between self-objectification and EDs is supported
by different studies showing a direct link between ED symp-
tomatology and a self-objectified view of themselves. However,
only a small subset of all the women exposed to idealized body
models develops EDs. To explain this point, the “Allocentric Lock
Hypothesis” (Riva, 2007, 2011, 2012; Riva and Gaudio, 2012; Riva
et al., 2012; Cesa et al., 2013; Gaudio and Riva, 2013; Riva et al.,
2013) suggested that EDs may be the outcome of a disturbance
in the way the body is experienced and remembered: individuals
with eating disorders may be locked to an “objectified body” that
is no longer updated by contrasting egocentric representations
driven by perception.
In our culture most women are dissatisfied about their body:
one adolescent girl out of two reports body dissatisfaction
(Makinen et al., 2012). More, cultural assumptions about weight
include the belief that diets offer women relief from dissatis-
faction with body size (Nell and Fredrickson, 1998). Normally,
after a successful diet, subjects experience a thinner body and
modify their objectified body accordingly (e.g., “I’m no more fat”)
improving body satisfaction. According to the Allocentric Lock
theory, however, subjects with eating disorders are locked into
their negative objectified body: its content cannot updated even
after a demanding diet and a significant weight loss.
The impossibility of meeting societal standards (e.g., I’m still
fat) transforms body dissatisfaction in body shame: the painful
social emotion that can result from measuring oneself against a
cultural standard and perceiving oneself as being judged and seen
as inferior, defective or unattractive in the eyes of others (Pinto-
Gouveia and Matos, 2011; Dakanalis et al., 2014a).
Different studies show that shame experiences are recorded in
autobiographical memory, influencing bodily self-consciousness
and self-relevant beliefs, inattentional and emotional processing
(Pinto-Gouveia and Matos, 2011). On one side, the tendency of
perception to be affected by our recurring thoughts produces an
attentional bias on body related stimuli: individuals selectively
attend to body stimuli because they represent their greater psy-
chological threat.
On the other side, it draws the subject’s attention to the
contents of the shame experience. In particular, shame-inducing
negative emotional events are retrieved in observer perspective, a
way of remembering in which the subject “sees” the self engaged
in the event as an observer would (Eich et al., 2012). As demon-
strated by Eich et al., during observer perspective we shut down
the neural circuitry in the insula that is central for monitoring our
bodies’ internal states (Eich et al., 2009). If this experience, due
to rumination, is repeated many times we can expect two effects:
first, the real-time experience of the body is switched off—we are
out of our own body; second, the real-time experience of the body
is substituted by the contents of the objectified body stored in
long-term memory.
Body shame is also accompanied by a sense of worthlessness
and powerlessness that make it the more painful and “destructive”
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social emotion with a critical role in the development of different
psychopathologies (Pinto-Gouveia and Matos, 2011). In partic-
ular, as samurai committed seppuku to remove shame, subjects
are ready to use the most extreme weight reduction techniques—
fasting, vomiting, laxatives, etc.—to achieve the same result. In
sum, they develop some form of EDs.
Obviously, Allocentric Lock is still a hypothesis. So, in this
final section, we present several avenues for future research on the
Allocentric Lock hypothesis.
As discussed before, the hypothesis presented in this paper has
multiple components that could be manipulated or assessed to
test its validity. The first step to assess the processes presented in
it would be to examine the presence of impairments of memory
processes in EDs. Different studies suggest both impairment in
autobiographical memory and working memory. For example,
AN patients have problems in accessing emotional memories
(Kova et al., 2011) and integrating both negative and positive
emotional experiences (Nandrino et al., 2006) (autobiographical
memory), and showed both hyperactivation in the parietal, and
especially the temporal, lobe during a working memory task
(Castro-Fornieles et al., 2010), as well as a compromised working
memory performance under the influence of subliminal food
images (Brooks et al., 2012) (working memory). However, further
studies should assess the capacity of autobiographical and work-
ing memory in processing body-related content, and eventually,
should identify the involved neural circuits.
Another way to explore the processes presented in the model
would be to examine the ability of ED patients in manipulat-
ing egocentric and allocentric representations. Here too, even if
some studies suggest impairment in this process (Smeets et al.,
1999; Cooper and Mohr, 2012; Laghi et al., 2013), future studies
should identify the extent of the impairment and its relation
with both memory processes and the manipulation of bodily
representations.
For example, a possible approach is to assess how egocentric
and allocentric data interact within the different bodily represen-
tations discussed in the paper. Both Guardia et al. (2010, 2012)
and Keizer et al. (2011, 2013) used interesting methodologies
to reach this goal. Their data, even if preliminary, suggest that
both conscious (i.e., the choice of a door-like aperture match-
ing the perceived size of the body) and unconscious (i.e., the
adaptive postural changes required to enter a door-like aperture)
egocentric body-related judgments are impaired in AN (Guardia
et al., 2012; Keizer et al., 2013). In both studies, AN patients
significantly overestimated the size of their real body. Further,
in the study by Guardia et al. (2012), the overestimation was
positively correlated with the body weight prior to disease onset,
as predicted by the Allocentric Lock hypothesis.
To more fully test the predictions made by the hypothesis, a
further approach is the use of neuroimaging studies to identify
and evaluate the neural circuits involved in the bodily experience
of patients with EDs. For example, we have seen that the allo-
centric lock has many similarities with out-of-body experiences.
Future researches may evaluate possible overlaps between the
neural circuits involved in both processes. A preliminary study
by McAdams and Krawczyk (2011) comparing AN patients with
normal controls found an impairment in the neural processing of
social attribution in the clinical sample. Specifically, they found
a reduced activation in the right TPJ, a key neural locus for the
etiology of autoscopic phenomena (Blanke et al., 2005).
It is also interesting to underline that the presented hypothesis
fits well with both the existing etiological models of EDs. On
one side, the allocentric lock produces a dysfunctional system for
evaluating self-worth in line with the assumptions of the trans-
diagnostic cognitive behavioral theory (Fairburn and Harrison,
2003; Fairburn et al., 2003). On the other side it suggests a
critical role of stress and anxiety related issues that fit well with
the revised cognitive-interpersonal maintenance model of AN
(Schmidt and Treasure, 2006; Treasure et al., 2012; Treasure and
Schmidt, 2013).
Nevertheless, as for any new approach, much more research is
needed before the proposed vision can be retained or discarded.
However, it provides a possible explanation of EDs that addresses
the complex etiology of these disturbances by including socio-
cultural and biological factors. Further, it suggests a clear link
between EDs, the experience of the body, autobiographical and
working memory, and the spatial reference frame brain areas,
which may be helpful to enhance the therapeutic options for these
disturbances.
First, a possible approach to counter the negative contents of
the objectified self memory is the use of cognitive dissonance-
based interventions (Stice et al., 2001, 2013; Perez et al., 2010).
These interventions, used to prevent EDs, aim to induce cognitive
dissonance with respect to standard of female beauty using small
group activities and homework assignments in which individuals
speak and act against the thin-ideal. As demonstrated by a meta-
analysis (Stice et al., 2008b) and different controlled trials, this
approach is able to reduce the risk for obesity and EDs onset with
some effects persisting through 3-year follow-up.
Another possible approach to counter the negative contents of
the objectified self memory is the competitive memory training—
COMET (Korrelboom et al., 2009) for improving low self esteem
in individuals with EDs. Starting from Brewin’s notion of a
“memory retrieval competition” in long-term memory (Brewin,
2006) between the different components of the the same concept,
this approach stimulate to retrieve and attend to positive autobi-
ographical memories that are incompatible with low self-esteem,
by using self-esteem promoting imagery, self-verbalizations, facial
and bodily expression, and music. Tested in a controlled trial
with 53 patients with EDs, this approach allowed a 27% higher
clinical change than a traditional EDs treatment (Korrelboom
et al., 2009).
Finally, the use of virtual reality (VR), a syntethic egocentric
experience, to modify the experience of the body in eating dis-
ordered patient is an another emerging approach (Ferrer-Garcia
et al., 2013). Ferrer-García and Gutiérrez-Maldonado conclude
their recent review about the use of VR for the treatment of
body image in EDs with the following words (Ferrer-García and
Gutiérrez-Maldonado, 2012): “Several conclusions can be drawn
from reviewed studies. VR-based therapies seem to be especially
suitable for improving body image both in ED patients and
in subclinical samples. . . All these studies showed significantly
greater improvement in measures related with body image when
the VR component was added” (p. 9).
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In conclusion, we know the power of understanding etiol-
ogy in the search for effective interventions: treatment is best
accomplished when we know the causes of a disorder. For this
reason, any step, even if partial, towards a better understanding
of EDs may be useful for identifying new and better treatment
options.
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